| All Hazards Approach |
Listing of Natural Hazards in the United States
Geological/Geophysical Hazards:
Avalanche
Earthquakes
Landslides/Mudslides/Rockfalls (submarine and terrestrial
Subsidence/Sink Holes/Expansive Soils
Tsunamis/seiches
Volcanic Activity, Super Volcanic Eruption (e.g. Yellowstone)
Meteorological/Climatological Hazards:
Coastal/Beach Erosion
Coastal Storm Surge
Drought/Desertification
Dust Storms
El Nino/La Nina, ENSO
Erosion
Extreme Cold, Crop Killing Freezes
Flooding (Flash & Slow-Onset)
Fog
Global Warming/Climate Change
Habitat conversion, degradation (e.g. wetland loss)
Hail Storms
Heat Waves/Extreme Heat/Urban Heat Islands
Hurricanes, Tropical Storms, Cyclones, Typhoons
Ice/Sleet/Snow/Blizzard/Ice Jams/Flows
Lightning
Meteor/Asteroid Impact
Rogue Waves
Sea Level Rise
Sun Flares
Thunderstorms
Tornadoes/Water Spouts
Wildfires
Wind, Derechos
Winter Storms, Nor’Eastrs
Biological Hazards:
Crop Infestation/Pestilence
Disease/Epidemics/Pandemics (human impact, animal impact, animal to human
impact)
Prepared on May 2, 2005 by:
B.Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., CEM
Emergency Management Higher Education Project Manager
Emergency Management Institute
National Emergency Training Center
Federal Emergency Management Agency
US Department of Homeland Security
wayne.blanchard@dhs.gov
301-447-1262
Reviewed and Amended by:
Greg Guibert
Program Manager
Natural Hazards Center
University of Colorado - Boulder
303-492-2149
Tricia Wachtendorf, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology & Criminal Justice
Core Faculty
Disaster Research Center
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716
Geological/Geophysical Hazards:
Avalanche
Earthquakes
Landslides/Mudslides/Rockfalls (submarine and terrestrial
Subsidence/Sink Holes/Expansive Soils
Tsunamis/seiches
Volcanic Activity, Super Volcanic Eruption (e.g. Yellowstone)
Meteorological/Climatological Hazards:
Coastal/Beach Erosion
Coastal Storm Surge
Drought/Desertification
Dust Storms
El Nino/La Nina, ENSO
Erosion
Extreme Cold, Crop Killing Freezes
Flooding (Flash & Slow-Onset)
Fog
Global Warming/Climate Change
Habitat conversion, degradation (e.g. wetland loss)
Hail Storms
Heat Waves/Extreme Heat/Urban Heat Islands
Hurricanes, Tropical Storms, Cyclones, Typhoons
Ice/Sleet/Snow/Blizzard/Ice Jams/Flows
Lightning
Meteor/Asteroid Impact
Rogue Waves
Sea Level Rise
Sun Flares
Thunderstorms
Tornadoes/Water Spouts
Wildfires
Wind, Derechos
Winter Storms, Nor’Eastrs
Biological Hazards:
Crop Infestation/Pestilence
Disease/Epidemics/Pandemics (human impact, animal impact, animal to human
impact)
Prepared on May 2, 2005 by:
B.Wayne Blanchard, Ph.D., CEM
Emergency Management Higher Education Project Manager
Emergency Management Institute
National Emergency Training Center
Federal Emergency Management Agency
US Department of Homeland Security
wayne.blanchard@dhs.gov
301-447-1262
Reviewed and Amended by:
Greg Guibert
Program Manager
Natural Hazards Center
University of Colorado - Boulder
303-492-2149
Tricia Wachtendorf, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Sociology & Criminal Justice
Core Faculty
Disaster Research Center
University of Delaware
Newark, DE 19716
Why an All Hazards rather than Hazard Specific Approach?
When disaster strikes, most people think immediately of first responders—police, fire, emergency
medical, and the like. And they should! These are the people who we depend on to confront the
consequences of disaster, at least initially. But behind the scenes, away from the tornado path or
the flooded homes, sits another important responder whose primary mission is to facilitate
coordination among the hundreds of on-scene personnel who represent dozens of agencies. This
person, and their staff, perform the emergency management function during the full life cycle of
any disaster, i.e., response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness. The multiorganizational
networks they seek to coordinate are comprised of personnel and resources from local, state and
federal government organizations and from the private sector (Drabek 2006b).
During the past three decades, emergency management has become more professionalized (e.
g., Petak 1984; Drabek 1987, 2003; Kuban 1993; Wilson and Oyola-Yamaiel 2000, 2005). An
important part of this transformation has been the explosive growth in higher education programs
designed to provide the fundamental knowledge and skills required of emergency managers
(Blanchard 2006). Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, curricula reflecting
homeland security issues and competencies have been established. Some have proposed that
these program areas should be better integrated. Indeed, some faculty and administrators
decided to simply adopt both terms for program identification as if there was no difference in
content, culture, or perspective.
, “civil defense” offices were funded for state governments and some local communities to
prepare for potential enemy attacks. But when natural or technological agents caused havoc
within communities, local officials confronted over 150 different federal units that had specialized
interests, programs, and resource priorities. One of the legacies of President Jimmy Carter was
the reorganization of this “bureaucratic buffet” into a single unified bureau he named the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Upon its creation in July, 1979, the new federal bureau
confronted the predictable reorganization growing pains reflective of the cultures learned by its
agency personnel. Under President Reagan the controversies regarding FEMA most often focused
on war related initiatives like the ill-fated “crisis relocation program” (May and Williams 1986).
Local governments repainted office doors with varying names ranging from civil defense to
emergency preparedness to emergency management or various combinations of these and
related terms.
During the 1990’s, the agency that too often was easy fodder for late night comics, was turned
around. President Clinton’s experiences as governor helped him realize the defects in the local-
state-federal partnerships that had failed President Herbert Walker Bush during the response to
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Clinton appointed his former state emergency manager from
Arkansas—Mr. James Lee Witt—as the FEMA director. Witt’s leadership, buttressed by continual
and consistent support from Clinton and key professionals like the late Lacy Suiter who had
directed the program in Tennessee, transformed the agency and headed the nation toward an
alternative philosophy of hazard and disaster management. No longer were floods to be viewed
as enemies best dealt with by the construction of more dams; rather a philosophy of
environmental sustainability became the assumption base. New federal policies, reflecting the
full life cycle of disaster, provided local and state officials with new tools and higher levels of
legitimacy than ever had been accorded most of those wearing civil defense clothes (McEntire
2006; 2007, pp. 86-104)). Collectively, more and more local government employees whose
agency missions were changing joined their national professional organization whose leadership
renamed the unit to become the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) (former
name was National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management) (e.g., see Drabek 1991;
Haddow and Bullock 2003).
medical, and the like. And they should! These are the people who we depend on to confront the
consequences of disaster, at least initially. But behind the scenes, away from the tornado path or
the flooded homes, sits another important responder whose primary mission is to facilitate
coordination among the hundreds of on-scene personnel who represent dozens of agencies. This
person, and their staff, perform the emergency management function during the full life cycle of
any disaster, i.e., response, recovery, mitigation and preparedness. The multiorganizational
networks they seek to coordinate are comprised of personnel and resources from local, state and
federal government organizations and from the private sector (Drabek 2006b).
During the past three decades, emergency management has become more professionalized (e.
g., Petak 1984; Drabek 1987, 2003; Kuban 1993; Wilson and Oyola-Yamaiel 2000, 2005). An
important part of this transformation has been the explosive growth in higher education programs
designed to provide the fundamental knowledge and skills required of emergency managers
(Blanchard 2006). Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, curricula reflecting
homeland security issues and competencies have been established. Some have proposed that
these program areas should be better integrated. Indeed, some faculty and administrators
decided to simply adopt both terms for program identification as if there was no difference in
content, culture, or perspective.
, “civil defense” offices were funded for state governments and some local communities to
prepare for potential enemy attacks. But when natural or technological agents caused havoc
within communities, local officials confronted over 150 different federal units that had specialized
interests, programs, and resource priorities. One of the legacies of President Jimmy Carter was
the reorganization of this “bureaucratic buffet” into a single unified bureau he named the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Upon its creation in July, 1979, the new federal bureau
confronted the predictable reorganization growing pains reflective of the cultures learned by its
agency personnel. Under President Reagan the controversies regarding FEMA most often focused
on war related initiatives like the ill-fated “crisis relocation program” (May and Williams 1986).
Local governments repainted office doors with varying names ranging from civil defense to
emergency preparedness to emergency management or various combinations of these and
related terms.
During the 1990’s, the agency that too often was easy fodder for late night comics, was turned
around. President Clinton’s experiences as governor helped him realize the defects in the local-
state-federal partnerships that had failed President Herbert Walker Bush during the response to
Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Clinton appointed his former state emergency manager from
Arkansas—Mr. James Lee Witt—as the FEMA director. Witt’s leadership, buttressed by continual
and consistent support from Clinton and key professionals like the late Lacy Suiter who had
directed the program in Tennessee, transformed the agency and headed the nation toward an
alternative philosophy of hazard and disaster management. No longer were floods to be viewed
as enemies best dealt with by the construction of more dams; rather a philosophy of
environmental sustainability became the assumption base. New federal policies, reflecting the
full life cycle of disaster, provided local and state officials with new tools and higher levels of
legitimacy than ever had been accorded most of those wearing civil defense clothes (McEntire
2006; 2007, pp. 86-104)). Collectively, more and more local government employees whose
agency missions were changing joined their national professional organization whose leadership
renamed the unit to become the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) (former
name was National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management) (e.g., see Drabek 1991;
Haddow and Bullock 2003).
All-Hazards Emergency Management
The mission of emergency management agencies today is much
broader than the mission given the predecessor “civil defense”
agencies of the 1950s and ‘60s. Today emergency management
agencies respond to almost all disasters and emergencies that may
occur. These include natural disasters such as flooding, fires, wind,
earthquakes, and disease, as well as man-made and “homeland
security” type incidents. In addition, the emergency management
agency becomes involved in activities such as planning for school
safety, providing interagency coordination for large-scale public
events like the Olympic games, and lending planning assistance
and resource support to law enforcement agencies for events such
as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings.
An all-hazards approach to emergency management
ensures effective and consistent response to any disaster
or emergency that threatens the citizens and communities
of a state. The foundation of the all-hazards approach is
the concept of Comprehensive Emergency Management
(CEM). The four phases of CEM are:
mitigation/prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery.
The mission of emergency management agencies today is much
broader than the mission given the predecessor “civil defense”
agencies of the 1950s and ‘60s. Today emergency management
agencies respond to almost all disasters and emergencies that may
occur. These include natural disasters such as flooding, fires, wind,
earthquakes, and disease, as well as man-made and “homeland
security” type incidents. In addition, the emergency management
agency becomes involved in activities such as planning for school
safety, providing interagency coordination for large-scale public
events like the Olympic games, and lending planning assistance
and resource support to law enforcement agencies for events such
as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank meetings.
An all-hazards approach to emergency management
ensures effective and consistent response to any disaster
or emergency that threatens the citizens and communities
of a state. The foundation of the all-hazards approach is
the concept of Comprehensive Emergency Management
(CEM). The four phases of CEM are:
mitigation/prevention, preparedness, response and
recovery.
Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model
William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD, Professor
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Terrorism is not like natural or even other man-made hazards. But, then
again, a tornado is not like a hurricane and certainly not like an earthquake.
The argument that the all-hazards model cannot accommodate hazards like
terrorism – especially bioterrorism – is most often based upon a fundamental
misunderstanding of the model. “All-hazards” does not literally mean being
prepared for any and all hazards that might manifest themselves in a
particular community, state, or nation. What it does mean is that there are
things that commonly occur in many kinds of disasters, such as the need for
emergency warning or mass evacuation, that can be addressed in a general
plan and that that plan can provide the basis for responding to unexpected
events. Emergency plans never, or virtually never, cover everything that might
be required in a disaster. Indeed, the requirements for evacuation for flood
may differ significantly from those required for evacuation during a hazardous
materials spill. Plans need to be adaptable to circumstances and emergency
managers and other officials, whether they be elected public officials or
corporate officers, also need to be adaptable, innovative, and, when
necessary, improvisational.
The theory is that “all-hazards” plans can provide a basic framework for
responding to a wide variety disasters, but planners typically address the kinds
of disasters that might be expected to occur. Emergency planning normally
begins with the identification of the disasters that have occurred in a
community in the recent past. These are the known and, generally, the most
probable hazards. Planners may then focus on the disasters that have
occurred in the distant past by going through newspaper archives, history
books, and other documents and by interviewing long-time residents. Other
hazards may be added to the list if it is determined that there may be some
probability of them causing risk to life and/or property or to the environment.
New highways and rail lines mean more potential for hazardous materials
accidents, for example. These are the probable threats. There may be some
talk of possible threats and some of them may be addressed in the plan, as
well. The media, political leaders, influential residents, or influential
participants in the planning process or the larger community may encourage
attention to hazards of very low probability or even of no discernible
possibility. Media attention can make hazards and disasters seem much
worse or more frequent than they really are. That is the so-called “CNN
effect.” Personal and family traumas may create champions for lesser risks.
The point is that these less probable or even improbable hazards may be
included in the planning. That’s politics and the planning process is, after all,
political as well as technical. It is also human nature. If the community is
lucky, the planners give greatest attention to the biggest risks. All-hazards
planning, then, is based upon the most likely disasters and the most
“popular.”
Terrorism is a hazard of uncertain probability for most communities and
organizations. The question is whether terrorism is so different from other
threats that the “all-hazards” approach is inappropriate or ineffective. Might
officials need to issue public warnings, order evacuations or sheltering-in-
place, call out law enforcement and fire service and EMS personnel, involve
hospitals and other medical resources, or mobilize volunteers? To the extent
that terrorist incidents might even resemble natural or technological disasters,
the response may be very similar. A bridge or building collapse, a fire, an
explosion, a power outage, and even a flood might result from terrorist
actions. Certainly the responses to the World Trade Center towers and
Pentagon attacks were much like responses to fires and structural failures.
While law enforcement officials were concerned with the preservation of
evidence, the emergency responses were much as they would have been to a
“regular” disaster – an act of God rather than an act of man. Emergency
planning now may include fire and EMS protocols to minimize disturbance of
evidence, but the basic response requirements remain. Bioterrorist attack may
require quarantine, special medical response, and other extraordinary
measures, including dealing with mass casualties on a scale unlike even the
largest natural disasters, but the basic plan is a beginning place for dealing
with such incidents. More importantly, community response will be guided by
the plans in place, likely an all-hazards plan. That plan should address not
only bioterrorism but flu and other naturally occurring pandemics.
All-hazards planning has the virtue of being cost effective in terms of time and
money. It is cheaper to develop and easier to remember a single plan even if
one has to wade through annexes to provide guidance for dealing with specific
issues. Hazardous materials accidents do require understanding of the
chemicals involved and technical expertise to minimize damage and protect
lives. Structural failures raise other issues concerning the conduct of
emergency response in unstable and unsafe environs. Floods raise public
health issues, as well as hazardous materials issues.
What the all-hazards approach can contribute to the effort to deal with
terrorism in its many forms is a basic framework for structuring the emergency
response, preparing for the response, and recovering from attacks, as well as
developing appropriate measures to prevent or reduce the impact of the
attacks – whatever form the attacks may take. It is also important to
remember that the threat of terrorism is less certain than other threats.
Indeed, the threat of earthquakes in California and the Pacific Northwest is
much more certain than the threat of terrorism, consequently investments in
capacity to deal with risks to life and property should be based upon that
priority. Similarly, the threat of hurricanes is more certain along the Gulf and
East coast than the threat of terrorism. As Hurricane Charley recently
demonstrated, the level of destruction may be even greater than that we have
experienced in terrorist attacks. Building capacity to deal with the most
probable events will increase capacity to deal with less probable events. For
private firms, unless they are a likely target of terrorists or are located
adjacent to such a target, the biggest threat may well be workplace violence of
other sorts. Physical security, from locked doors and closed circuit television
systems to armed guards and employee identification cards, can address a
variety of threats. In short, precautions to deal with criminal intruders,
disgruntled employees, angry spouses, and enraged clients can also serve as
foundation for an anti-terrorism program and an all-hazards plan can provide
the framework for a response.
Finally, the all-hazards approach encourages a broader perspective. Attention
to the potential to prevent or reduce the impact of hazards is important. The
Department of Homeland Security has been focused on the prevention of
terrorist incidents, even though the department’s mission statement also
mentions reducing the impact of incidences that do occur. Mitigation efforts
can reduce the political benefits of terrorist violence and the psychological
impact. Recovery planning can reduce the social and economic impact, as
well. All-hazards planning does encourage a broader perspective on risks and
how to deal with them and a broader foundation on which to build effective
programs to manage hazards and disasters.
Contact Information: William Waugh at wwaugh@gsu.edu.
(revised version of paper presented on the IDS Emergency Management On-
Line Conference, June 28-July 16, 2004)
William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD, Professor
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies
Georgia State University
Terrorism is not like natural or even other man-made hazards. But, then
again, a tornado is not like a hurricane and certainly not like an earthquake.
The argument that the all-hazards model cannot accommodate hazards like
terrorism – especially bioterrorism – is most often based upon a fundamental
misunderstanding of the model. “All-hazards” does not literally mean being
prepared for any and all hazards that might manifest themselves in a
particular community, state, or nation. What it does mean is that there are
things that commonly occur in many kinds of disasters, such as the need for
emergency warning or mass evacuation, that can be addressed in a general
plan and that that plan can provide the basis for responding to unexpected
events. Emergency plans never, or virtually never, cover everything that might
be required in a disaster. Indeed, the requirements for evacuation for flood
may differ significantly from those required for evacuation during a hazardous
materials spill. Plans need to be adaptable to circumstances and emergency
managers and other officials, whether they be elected public officials or
corporate officers, also need to be adaptable, innovative, and, when
necessary, improvisational.
The theory is that “all-hazards” plans can provide a basic framework for
responding to a wide variety disasters, but planners typically address the kinds
of disasters that might be expected to occur. Emergency planning normally
begins with the identification of the disasters that have occurred in a
community in the recent past. These are the known and, generally, the most
probable hazards. Planners may then focus on the disasters that have
occurred in the distant past by going through newspaper archives, history
books, and other documents and by interviewing long-time residents. Other
hazards may be added to the list if it is determined that there may be some
probability of them causing risk to life and/or property or to the environment.
New highways and rail lines mean more potential for hazardous materials
accidents, for example. These are the probable threats. There may be some
talk of possible threats and some of them may be addressed in the plan, as
well. The media, political leaders, influential residents, or influential
participants in the planning process or the larger community may encourage
attention to hazards of very low probability or even of no discernible
possibility. Media attention can make hazards and disasters seem much
worse or more frequent than they really are. That is the so-called “CNN
effect.” Personal and family traumas may create champions for lesser risks.
The point is that these less probable or even improbable hazards may be
included in the planning. That’s politics and the planning process is, after all,
political as well as technical. It is also human nature. If the community is
lucky, the planners give greatest attention to the biggest risks. All-hazards
planning, then, is based upon the most likely disasters and the most
“popular.”
Terrorism is a hazard of uncertain probability for most communities and
organizations. The question is whether terrorism is so different from other
threats that the “all-hazards” approach is inappropriate or ineffective. Might
officials need to issue public warnings, order evacuations or sheltering-in-
place, call out law enforcement and fire service and EMS personnel, involve
hospitals and other medical resources, or mobilize volunteers? To the extent
that terrorist incidents might even resemble natural or technological disasters,
the response may be very similar. A bridge or building collapse, a fire, an
explosion, a power outage, and even a flood might result from terrorist
actions. Certainly the responses to the World Trade Center towers and
Pentagon attacks were much like responses to fires and structural failures.
While law enforcement officials were concerned with the preservation of
evidence, the emergency responses were much as they would have been to a
“regular” disaster – an act of God rather than an act of man. Emergency
planning now may include fire and EMS protocols to minimize disturbance of
evidence, but the basic response requirements remain. Bioterrorist attack may
require quarantine, special medical response, and other extraordinary
measures, including dealing with mass casualties on a scale unlike even the
largest natural disasters, but the basic plan is a beginning place for dealing
with such incidents. More importantly, community response will be guided by
the plans in place, likely an all-hazards plan. That plan should address not
only bioterrorism but flu and other naturally occurring pandemics.
All-hazards planning has the virtue of being cost effective in terms of time and
money. It is cheaper to develop and easier to remember a single plan even if
one has to wade through annexes to provide guidance for dealing with specific
issues. Hazardous materials accidents do require understanding of the
chemicals involved and technical expertise to minimize damage and protect
lives. Structural failures raise other issues concerning the conduct of
emergency response in unstable and unsafe environs. Floods raise public
health issues, as well as hazardous materials issues.
What the all-hazards approach can contribute to the effort to deal with
terrorism in its many forms is a basic framework for structuring the emergency
response, preparing for the response, and recovering from attacks, as well as
developing appropriate measures to prevent or reduce the impact of the
attacks – whatever form the attacks may take. It is also important to
remember that the threat of terrorism is less certain than other threats.
Indeed, the threat of earthquakes in California and the Pacific Northwest is
much more certain than the threat of terrorism, consequently investments in
capacity to deal with risks to life and property should be based upon that
priority. Similarly, the threat of hurricanes is more certain along the Gulf and
East coast than the threat of terrorism. As Hurricane Charley recently
demonstrated, the level of destruction may be even greater than that we have
experienced in terrorist attacks. Building capacity to deal with the most
probable events will increase capacity to deal with less probable events. For
private firms, unless they are a likely target of terrorists or are located
adjacent to such a target, the biggest threat may well be workplace violence of
other sorts. Physical security, from locked doors and closed circuit television
systems to armed guards and employee identification cards, can address a
variety of threats. In short, precautions to deal with criminal intruders,
disgruntled employees, angry spouses, and enraged clients can also serve as
foundation for an anti-terrorism program and an all-hazards plan can provide
the framework for a response.
Finally, the all-hazards approach encourages a broader perspective. Attention
to the potential to prevent or reduce the impact of hazards is important. The
Department of Homeland Security has been focused on the prevention of
terrorist incidents, even though the department’s mission statement also
mentions reducing the impact of incidences that do occur. Mitigation efforts
can reduce the political benefits of terrorist violence and the psychological
impact. Recovery planning can reduce the social and economic impact, as
well. All-hazards planning does encourage a broader perspective on risks and
how to deal with them and a broader foundation on which to build effective
programs to manage hazards and disasters.
Contact Information: William Waugh at wwaugh@gsu.edu.
(revised version of paper presented on the IDS Emergency Management On-
Line Conference, June 28-July 16, 2004)
There seems little justification for federal support to emphasize
terrorism preparedness at the expense of more comprehensive all-
hazards preparedness. The DHS has identified 36 first responder
capabilities specific to terrorism. Of the 36, a full 30 are all-hazards.
While intelligence and law enforcement may prevent a terrorist attack, and
infrastructure, environmental planning and weather systems may mitigate the
impact of natural and accidental disasters, the human and financial costs of the
latter can be just as devastating as the former. Moreover, natural disasters like
terrorist attacks to do not confine their impact to one town, county or state. In many
cases, they can be a national event even if the more serious impact is local.
National Planning Scenarios, which are “all hazards planning scenarios for use in
national,
federal, state and local homeland security preparedness exercises” created by the
DHS, overwhelmingly focus on terrorism. Of the 15 national planning scenarios, 12
of them are terrorist attacks and only 3 are natural disasters:
1. Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kilton Improvised Nuclear Device
2. Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza
4. Biological Attack – Plague
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
6. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
7. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
8. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
10. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
11. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Device
12. Explosive Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device
13. Biological Attack – Food Contamination
14. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth diseases)
15. Cyber Attack
Some state and local officials as well as experts in emergency preparedness felt
that these scenarios did not adequately reflect an assessment of risk and
questioned whether these were appropriate planning scenarios in terms of
plausibility and number of scenarios that are based on terrorist attacks.
After the devastating consequences of Hurricane Katrina, the House of
Representatives
acknowledged the importance of all-hazards preparedness in its appropriations bill
for the
Department of Homeland Security:
The Committee believes that the Office of the Under Secretary for Preparedness
must continue to encourage an all-hazards approach to preparedness in grants,
assistance, and funding requests and allocations. The House Bipartisan
Committee on Hurricane Katrina concluded that, while a majority of State and
local preparedness grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this does not
preclude a dual use application…The Committee expects that the fiscal year
2007 grant guidance will further support all-hazards activities. The Committee
encourages the Under Secretary for Preparedness to give natural disasters
appropriate weight in its risk based funding methodology.
In the appropriations bill for homeland security, the House did not adopt the cuts to
all-hazards programs proposed by the administration. Yet, these two programs
would constitute only 22% of federal funding to state and local governments for first
responder and related money. It is not enough for Congress to say that the
Preparedness Directorate should “continue to encourage” all-hazards. Natural and
accidental disasters must be recognized for what they are: all too common costly
events that negatively impact our country and its economy. The nation will be more
secure and mitigate the costs of disaster if more than rhetoric is applied to the all-
hazards approach to preparedness.
Anita Dancs
Research Director
National Priorities Project
413-584-9556
anita@nationalpriorities.org
terrorism preparedness at the expense of more comprehensive all-
hazards preparedness. The DHS has identified 36 first responder
capabilities specific to terrorism. Of the 36, a full 30 are all-hazards.
While intelligence and law enforcement may prevent a terrorist attack, and
infrastructure, environmental planning and weather systems may mitigate the
impact of natural and accidental disasters, the human and financial costs of the
latter can be just as devastating as the former. Moreover, natural disasters like
terrorist attacks to do not confine their impact to one town, county or state. In many
cases, they can be a national event even if the more serious impact is local.
National Planning Scenarios, which are “all hazards planning scenarios for use in
national,
federal, state and local homeland security preparedness exercises” created by the
DHS, overwhelmingly focus on terrorism. Of the 15 national planning scenarios, 12
of them are terrorist attacks and only 3 are natural disasters:
1. Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kilton Improvised Nuclear Device
2. Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
3. Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza
4. Biological Attack – Plague
5. Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
6. Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
7. Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
8. Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
9. Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
10. Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
11. Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Device
12. Explosive Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device
13. Biological Attack – Food Contamination
14. Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth diseases)
15. Cyber Attack
Some state and local officials as well as experts in emergency preparedness felt
that these scenarios did not adequately reflect an assessment of risk and
questioned whether these were appropriate planning scenarios in terms of
plausibility and number of scenarios that are based on terrorist attacks.
After the devastating consequences of Hurricane Katrina, the House of
Representatives
acknowledged the importance of all-hazards preparedness in its appropriations bill
for the
Department of Homeland Security:
The Committee believes that the Office of the Under Secretary for Preparedness
must continue to encourage an all-hazards approach to preparedness in grants,
assistance, and funding requests and allocations. The House Bipartisan
Committee on Hurricane Katrina concluded that, while a majority of State and
local preparedness grants are required to have a terrorism purpose, this does not
preclude a dual use application…The Committee expects that the fiscal year
2007 grant guidance will further support all-hazards activities. The Committee
encourages the Under Secretary for Preparedness to give natural disasters
appropriate weight in its risk based funding methodology.
In the appropriations bill for homeland security, the House did not adopt the cuts to
all-hazards programs proposed by the administration. Yet, these two programs
would constitute only 22% of federal funding to state and local governments for first
responder and related money. It is not enough for Congress to say that the
Preparedness Directorate should “continue to encourage” all-hazards. Natural and
accidental disasters must be recognized for what they are: all too common costly
events that negatively impact our country and its economy. The nation will be more
secure and mitigate the costs of disaster if more than rhetoric is applied to the all-
hazards approach to preparedness.
Anita Dancs
Research Director
National Priorities Project
413-584-9556
anita@nationalpriorities.org
Government agencies and private industry have long been concerned with ensuring
continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity of government (COG) during and after
emergencies. However, a variety of natural and technological emergencies over the last
few years have underscored the importance of ensuring the continuity of essential
government functions across the U.S. Federal Executive Branch.
continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity of government (COG) during and after
emergencies. However, a variety of natural and technological emergencies over the last
few years have underscored the importance of ensuring the continuity of essential
government functions across the U.S. Federal Executive Branch.
Gov. Gilmore, Dr. Wayne Blanchard (FEMA Higher Ed Project), and Dr. Houston Polson (HSDEC)
2nd DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff
www.MickMaurer.com
Timely, accurate, unambiguous & credible WARNING
American Families deserve an ALL-Hazards timely,
accurate, unambiguous & credible WARNING
system, and not just a hazard specific system.
accurate, unambiguous & credible WARNING
system, and not just a hazard specific system.
PAST Warnings
NEW Warnings
Secretary Tom Ridge, first DHS Secretary
3rd DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano
Then:
July 15, 2009
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said a bipartisan
panel of experts would report on the efficiency of the system within
60 days.
“I have assembled a task force, made up of Democrats and
Republicans, elected officials at the state and local level, security
experts, law enforcement officials and other professionals to
assess our current threat level system and provide options for any
improvements that are needed,” she said in a statement.
“My goal is simple: to have the most effective system in place to
inform the American people about threats to our country.” The
secretary — who heads a department created after the attacks —
appointed Fran Townsend, who was a top security advisor to former
president George W. Bush, to lead the panel.
Now:
July 13. 2010
* The United States government's national threat level is Elevated,
or Yellow.
* For all domestic and international flights, the U.S. threat level is
High, or Orange. See the Transportation Security
July 15, 2009
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said a bipartisan
panel of experts would report on the efficiency of the system within
60 days.
“I have assembled a task force, made up of Democrats and
Republicans, elected officials at the state and local level, security
experts, law enforcement officials and other professionals to
assess our current threat level system and provide options for any
improvements that are needed,” she said in a statement.
“My goal is simple: to have the most effective system in place to
inform the American people about threats to our country.” The
secretary — who heads a department created after the attacks —
appointed Fran Townsend, who was a top security advisor to former
president George W. Bush, to lead the panel.
Now:
July 13. 2010
* The United States government's national threat level is Elevated,
or Yellow.
* For all domestic and international flights, the U.S. threat level is
High, or Orange. See the Transportation Security
Task Force Recommendations:
The Question of Colors
As to the specific question of whether to retain some form of the nation’s current color code system,
the Task Force was divided. Though recommending reform of the current system, half of the Task
Force membership believes the concept of color-coded alerts is sufficiently clear, powerful and easily
understood to be retained as one element in the Secretary’s alerts to the nation. By equal number,
Task Force membership believes the color code system has suffered from a lack of credibility and
clarity leading to an erosion of public confidence such that it should be abandoned. However, the
Task Force members are unanimous, that if the Secretary decides to retain a system of alerts
utilizing colors, that substantial reform is required.
Fuller Disclosure
#3 Consistent with national security, alerts issued by the Secretary should provide the fullest degree
of information possible. The Secretary should consider, consistent with national security concerns,
the declassification and disclosing of:
• Specific detail of the threat information (e.g. credible, specific, actionable) • Region and sector
most affected • Level of credibility and confidence in the threat information • Steps government is
taking to respond to t he threat • Protective measures public can take • Places to go to get more
information • When and how the government will keep public updated
Read Full Task Force Report
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